Criticism Peacekeeping

1 criticism

1.1 peacekeeping, human trafficking, , forced prostitution
1.2 peacekeepers , haiti cholera crisis
1.3 cultural concerns related contemporary peacekeeping
1.4 limitations on contemporary intervention , conflict resolution
1.5 mission creep
1.6 lack of engagement populace

criticism
peacekeeping, human trafficking, , forced prostitution

since 1990s, un peacekeepers have been subject of numerous accusations of abuse ranging rape , sexual assault, pedophilia , human trafficking. complaints have arisen cambodia, east timor , west africa. in bosnia-herzegovina prostitution associated trafficked women skyrocketed , operated beyond gates of u.n. compounds. david lamb, regional human rights officer in bosnia 2000 2001 claimed “the sex slave trade in bosnia largely exists because of u.n. peacekeeping operation. without peacekeeping presence, there have been little or no forced prostitution in bosnia.” in addition, hearing held u.s. house of representatives in 2002 found members of sfor frequenting bosnian brothels , engaging in sex trafficked women , underage girls.

reporters witnessed rapid increase in prostitution in cambodia, mozambique, bosnia, , kosovo after un and, in case of latter two, nato peacekeeping forces moved in. in 1996 un study called impact of armed conflict on children , former first lady of mozambique graça machel documented: in 6 out of 12 country studies on sexual exploitation of children in situations of armed conflict prepared present report, arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated rapid rise in child prostitution .

gita sahgal spoke out in 2004 regard fact prostitution , sex abuse crops wherever humanitarian intervention efforts set up. observed issue un peacekeeping operations unfortunately seem doing same thing other militaries do. guardians have guarded .

an investigation prince zeid ra’ad zeid al-hussein, permanent representative of jordan united nations, in 2006 resulted in comprehensive report detailed of abuse in detail— particularly occurred in democratic republic of congo. sexual exploitation came in form of prostitution, wherein money (an average of $1-$3 per encounter) exchanged sex. in other instances food, or jobs utilized ply women sex. other young women reported of “rape disguised prostitution”, whereabouts peacekeepers rape them , given money or food in order make act seem consensual. between may , september 2004, there seventy-two allegations of sexual exploitation—68 against military , 4 against civilian personnel. end of 2004 there total of 105 allegations. majority of these allegations in regards sex person under age of 18 years (45 percent) , sex adult prostitutes (31 percent). rape , sexual assault made approximately 13 , 5 percent respectively, remaining 6 percent of allegations relating other forms of sexual exploitation. of allegations against peacekeepers pakistan, uruguay, morocco, tunisia, south africa, , nepal.

uruguayan president jose mujica apologized haitian president michel martelly on alleged rape of 18-year-old haitian man uruguayan un peacekeeping troops. martelly said collective rape carried out against young haitian not go unpunished. 4 soldiers suspected of being involved in rape have been detained.

in july 2007 united nations department of peacekeeping operations (dpko) confined entire contingent of 734 moroccans in ivory coast in wake of allegations had sexually abused underage girls. in following years, there 80 investigations carried out un office of internal oversight services (oios). in 2013, allegations levelled on personnel france, gabon, , burundi operating in central african republic. these include accusations of sexual abuse , exploitation of @ least 108 kemo prefecture , vast majority of cases involved minors. in 2016, more allegations of abuse levelled on peacekeepers operating in democratic republic of congo’s eastern province of north kivu. tanzania , un opened joint inquiry alleged abuse, involved tanzanian troops. there have been 18 reports of sexual abuse, 8 of involved minors. sixteen tanzanian soldiers, malawian , south african implicated in accusations. un reported in march 2016 there large increase in allegations; involved troops twenty 1 countries. of allegations involved troops african countries including: cameroon, congo, tanzania, benin, burkina faso, burundi, ghana, madagascar, niger, nigeria, rwanda, senegal , togo.

peacekeepers , haiti cholera crisis

significant scientific evidence, first reported associated press, , later new york times, al jazeera, , abc news has shown nepalese peacekeeping troops stationed @ remote base in mirebalais, haiti, triggered deadly cholera epidemic has ravaged country since october 2010. cholera waterborne disease causes diarrhoea , vomiting, , can kill in matter of hours if patients not receive rehydration intervention. of july 2012, haiti s cholera epidemic worst in world: 7,500 had died , 585,000 haitians (about 1 in every 20 haitians) had become ill disease.

according un-appointed independent panel of experts on cholera outbreak in haiti, conditions @ peacekeeping base unsafe, , allowed contamination of haiti s river systems in @ least 2 ways: construction of water pipes in main toilet/showering area [was] haphazard, significant potential cross-contamination...especially pipes run on open drainage ditch runs throughout camp , flows directly meye tributary system . additionally, independent panel reported on regular basis black water waste mirebalais base , 2 other bases deposited in open, unfenced septic pit susceptible flooding , overflow meye tributary during rainfall.

in november 2011, on 5,000 victims of cholera epidemic filed claim un s internal claims mechanism seeking redress in form of clean water , sanitation infrastructure necessary control epidemic, compensation individual losses, , apology. in july 2012, 104 members of united states congress signed letter affirming actions of un had brought cholera haiti , un should confront , eliminate cholera . in 2013 un rejected claim , victims lawyers have pledged sue un in court.

cultural concerns related contemporary peacekeeping

there notable intermingling of varied cultures when comes peacekeeping. vast number of troops, police , personnel brought various contributing countries oftentimes challenging ethnic regions peacekeeping forces deployed. because of these varied cultures, complicated cultural interactions take place not affect mission effectiveness, can lead friction population peacekeepers meant assisting.

in cases prior 1988, specific countries provided peacekeepers. @ point, twenty 6 countries had sent personnel participate in peacekeeping deployments. today, number has risen more eighty. results in extremely heterogeneous group. thus, un peacekeeping deployments must not contend language complications, myriad cultural , social differences can create operational difficulties hard overcome. these difference can create problems regard interactions (whether personal or between institutions/units), misunderstandings, inadvertent offensive behaviour , prejudices may associated particular contingent given country.

in terms of operations, effectiveness can hindered varying tactics, techniques , procedures employed military or police personnel part of given deployment. because un forces cobbled many different sources, there discrepancy in capabilities, training, equipment, standards , procedures. moreover, substantial differences exist in form of command , control between contributing members personnel. in addition, nations may not wish subordinated another, complicating unity of command. can lead deep-seated divisions between contingents within un force results in lack of mutual support between units in field. can demonstrated in experiences of un peacekeeping forces deployed east timor, australians engaged in robust operation maximised force protection in contrast pro-active heart , minds approach utilised great britain s ghurka personnel.

maintaining consent of peacekept important facet of modern peacekeeping. notably in bosnia, somalia , rwanda, fundamental principles of retaining consent ignored on grounds of humanitarian intervention—reflecting nature of article vii intervention. yet in order stress , maintain legitimacy of intervention important un s forces continue enjoy consent of population , government of country deployed. means making peacekept feel part of process in addition important cultural knowledge of area in peacekeepers operating, in order reduce friction , provide successful operation.

there has been little study on interaction of cultures exist within peacekeeping force , population within operate. however, in 1976 galtun , hveem studied norwegian personnel participated in unef-1 (in gaza) , onuc (congo). posited knowledge of culture , understanding of inhabitants in given country not necessary, crucial success of mission. found personnel norwegian contingent wanted greater insight conflict , culture in operated. wanted more robust training regard working people other countries. yet study revealed troops received little briefings , majority of information regarding conflict gained through news, reading books or speaking other un personnel—rather established un training program.

similarly, study conducted on relations between members of unifil , local population in lebanon, carried out heiberg , holst, confirmed findings. in example, found countries able integrate more population , show depth of knowledge local culture more successful, while ambitious, less integrated local scene found far removed individuals supposed engaged with, , success, or lack thereof, illustrated this.

only italian contingent of 2,200 people operated part of local environment , became active element in restoring normal living conditions. soldiers provided training required acquaint them cultural, political , social situation of people among whom worked. operating in sector contained approximately 600,000 inhabitants, shi ites, italians nurtured contact ordinary citizens , political leaders in area... while americans thought becoming involved in lebanese politics, entered lebanese culture , history little or no understanding of way things worked-- or didn t work... americans did not understand subtleties of short-term alliances, length of memories , blood feuds, strength of aln [kin] in arab culture nor nuances of religious differences.

this illustrates importance of understanding significance culture plays in conduct of successful peacekeeping operations. however, despite existence of un training manual attempts advise peacekeepers on necessary techniques, there no unifying doctrine, or standardised procedure among peacekeeping contingents, hinder potential success.

limitations on contemporary intervention , conflict resolution

throughout duration of cold war external intervention , mediation in civil conflicts took on state-centric mechanism in sovereignty inviolable. did international community intervene in internal conflicts involving state s government , domestic belligerents opposed it. since end of cold war, however, has changed. today, mediation international actors in civil conflict rest on standardised resolution mechanism accords broadly equal standing factions within conflict, , attempts reach settlement accepted all.

the end of cold war presented opportunity reshape international system. opportunity afforded cold war s victor s-- say—the united states , other western capitalist states governed liberal-democratic values put premium on basic human rights , democratization. in preceding decades state entity receive special status. while there exceptions, such groups struggling against colonial powers, state possessed ultimate degree of legitimacy. result, international community meddled internal machinations of given country. sovereignty not violated , system benefited both superpowers, allies, third world governments.

now, however, legitimacy being extended non-state actors, opportunity minority secede given state , form new country there has been dramatic shift in international status quo. moreover, international community s model conflict resolution heavily influenced academic thought developed in western countries. model encourages intervening in civil wars in order stop political violence , come negotiated settlement involves democratising efforts. critics such christopher clapham , david shearer, argue intervention can provide mechanisms continued conflict detriment of civilian population. clapham s argument principally in relation situation in rwanda leading genocide, whereas shearer focuses on negative aspects of intervention, regarding sierra leone, prevents total victory 1 side , results in creation of asymmetries between belligerents opens door continued bloodshed.

in rwanda, third-party attempts @ negotiated settlement between hutu , tutsi afforded opportunity hutu extremists prepare killing of hutu moderates , genocide of tutsi. international community, led regional states organisation of african unity, sought negotiate settlement , find solution ongoing ethnic violence between hutu , tutsi via arusha peace process. process lasted on year, included substantial international involvement, , incorporated many regional actors such tanzania (host of process), burundi, uganda , zaire.

while rwandan patriotic front (rpf) major beneficiary of arusha accords , able redress many of grievances, many of gains made have been achieved through military action. arusha, according clapham, affected relative power of participants in 2 following ways: ceasfire froze distribution of territorial control @ particular point , secondly importance ascribed participants of negotiations. meaning froze conflict , prevented continued territorial gains being made rpf, in addition designating degree of importance regard factions within negotiations. faction s importance weighted not on relative popularity or military strength, on artificial weight assigned mediators. thus, entire process served undermine rpf s position while stalling hitherto successful military campaign, while allowing hutu extremists prepare genocide.

shearer argues modern strategies rely solely on consent-based negotiations severely limited , victory military means should not ignored. states shift in battlefield fortunes can bring 1 belligerent negotiation table , likewise moderate demands.

consent of great importance when comes negotiation , mediation. current international system , conflict resolution model international community has utilised since end of cold war puts premium on consent. shearer asks if belligerent uses negotiations , cease-fires method of delay in order allow them reposition military forces , continue fighting, should consent-based strategies still pursued, regardless of potential lengthening conflict , associated human cost?

according empirical analysis cited shearer, past civil wars negotiated settlements have had little success. cites study john stedman notes between 1900 , 1980 85% of civil wars solved 1 side winning outright (this excludes colonial wars). 15% percent ended result of negotiation. additionally, roy licklider s study supports these conclusions noting following:

1945 1989, 58 out of total of 93 civil conflicts, categorised them, settled in form, while remainder continued. however, 14 (or 24 percent) of settled solved negotiation. others (76 percent) ended military victories. additionally, fighting resumed in 7 of 14 conflict ended negotiation. overall success rate of negotiated settlements, therefore, around 12 percent out of internal wars ended.

in sierra leone revolutionary united front, led foday sankoh, fought ongoing , bloody civil war government 1991 1996. conflict attracted little international attention, managed devastate country , destroy economy. neither belligerent willing concede or compromise on demands, despite multiple attempts @ negotiated settlement. not until intervention of private military corporation executive outcomes , reversal in ruf s battlefield fortunes sankoh come table.

in aftermath ruf depleted threat, civilians able return refugee camps , begin rebuilding lives. peace fragile , negotiations ongoing. ruf reluctant put down arms, concerned on potential retribution @ hands of army units , civilian militias alike. there planned deployment of un peacekeepers meant ease these concerns , transition peace, things began unravel. international contributors began shy away further peacekeeping initiatives; such expensive , open-ended mission in strategically unimportant country. result, un s intervention force slow come fruition , came halt when sankoh argued size of contingent of 740 un peacekeepers large.

the un refused engage without total consent both parties, preventing deployment of peacekeeping force. consent-based approach, shearer argues, illustrates limits un can play in volatile , fragile state of affairs exist during , after civil wars. in sierra leone, meant important component needed shore peace-building process absent. meant sankoh dictating terms. consent-based approach allowed leadership of brutal rebel group hinder potential peace.

the situation exacerbated fact newly elected president of sierra leone terminated executive outcomes contract undermining hard power advantage. things further inflamed when disaffected officers of army overthrew government in 1997. war renewed. small un force of monitors deployed observe security situation. unomsil, called, deployed between july 1998 , october 1999, forced withdraw country when ruf took country s capitol.

unamsil formed , deployed in 1999, authorised under chapter vii mandate, meant enforce lome agreements. however, violence continue. outset ruf beyond uncooperative , once ecomog contingent withdrew, ruf attacked un forces, taking hundreds hostage. led unexpected backlash international community ruf did not anticipate. leadership had expected international community cut , run, had done in somalia , earlier when unomsil fled freetown. instead, british support, aggressive campaign waged against ruf. unamsil s mandate expanded , manpower enlarged. late 2000 , 2001 ruf s military strength had been severely depleted. abuja agreements signed , unamsil fulfilled mandate in december 2005. while sierra leone @ peace today , un s mission can deemed success, way in situation developed illustrates shearer s point: consent-based approach focused on negotiation encompasses belligerents interest may not lead success. see, fighting continued despite presence of unomsil. indeed, after unomsil replaced more robust force under chapter vii mandate in form of unamsil violence continued. not until british intervened militarily , substantially degraded ruf s capability sustain conflict, executive outcomes had done years prior, did ruf come negotiating table , allow establishment of peace.

some authors question idea of international interventions @ all. in 2005 working paper center global development, jeremy weinstein of stanford university provides theory of “autonomous recovery,” in states can achieve sustainable peace without international intervention. using case studies of uganda, eritrea, , somalia, weinstein demonstrates how states can develop effective institutions out of warfare. method has cost , benefits must weighed against potential outcome of international intervention. external intervention can stop mass atrocities, stop institutional change. autonomous recovery elevates strongest leader, rewards strongest fighters may less inclined share power. furthermore, intervention depends on external influence while autonomous recovery based on internal factors. conclusions of argument suggest intervention not ideal policy, weinstein argues international community’s “responsibility protect” doctrine has moral importance intervention , conditions “autonomous recovery” rare. weinstein argues fundamental challenge how incentivise governance , assistance rebel groups without disrupting connection of citizens rulers in terms of revenue collection enables accountability.

mission creep

although acknowledging number of practical , moral reasons peacekeeping operations, james fearon , david laitin assert have tendency under circumstances become tangled state-building efforts. in weak states facing successful guerrilla campaigns, peacekeepers face pressures build state institutional , administrative capacity in order achieve lasting peace. these pressures can lead mission creep beyond original purview of peacekeeping operation; without engaging in state-building, peacekeepers risk allowing peacekept country revert violence following exit. thus, fearon , laitin advocate greater integration of state-building in peacekeeping efforts through new framework of neotrusteeship, see foreign powers exercising great deal of control on weak state s domestic affairs in order ensure prevention of future violence.

lack of engagement populace

a growing critique of peacekeeping lack of engagement between peacekeeping officials , local populace. severine autessrre outlines in 2015 foreign policy article, creates environment peacekeeping officials develop plans ‘keep’ peace, disconnected reality, having opposite effect on ground. additionally, creates reinforcement mechanism peacekeeping officials, because officials on ground report plan implemented, but, in reality, had adverse effects. if situation on ground turns outbreak of violence, local populace blamed.

this criticism similar critic levelled @ development in developing countries authors such james c. scott, james ferguson, , l. lohman. although peacekeeping , development 2 different things, logic behind criticism same. third-party officials-whether peacekeepers or agents of development-are isolated general populace, believing know best, , refusing gather information ground level. not out of maliciousness or imperialism, out of legitimate belief they, educated officials access other experts , versed in development , peacekeeping literature, know best.